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Abstract
This study aims to analyze the existence and orientation shift of 
the radical Islamic group movement in the era of democratic de-
centralization, with the case study of Islamic Reformist Movement 
in Cianjur, West Java, therewith influencing factors. Based on the 
qualitative method, the data collected from various sources reveal 
that there is an orientation shift of radical Islamic group move-
ment in the era of democratic decentralization; from ‘Islamism’ 
to ‘premanism’. ‘Islamism’, that usually becomes the main issue, 
has now shifted to the domination of economic resources. This 
orientation shift is one of the ways for its survival. Patron-client 
political model of the New Order regime appears but in different 
forms; its characteristics and forms are also more fluid. Before and 
during the beginning of the Reformation Era, the orientation of 
radical Islamic group movement is more dominated by ideological 
motive such as the implementation of Islamic sharia, while during 
the era of democratic decentralization, its movement orientation 
shifts to economic pragmatism.
Studi ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis eksistensi dan 
pergeseran orientasi gerakan kelompok Islam radikal di era 
desentralisasi demokrasi, dengan studi kasus Gerakan Re-
formis Islam di Cianjur, Jawa Barat, serta faktor-faktor yang 
memengaruhinya. Dengan metode kualitatif, data yang di-
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kumpulkan dari berbagai sumber mengungkapkan bahwa 
ada pergeseran orientasi gerakan kelompok Islam radikal di 
era desentralisasi demokrasi; dari ‘Islamisme ke ‘premanisme’. 
‘Islamisme’ yang pada awalnya menjadi isu utama gerakan, 
telah bergeser ke arah penguasaan sumber daya ekonomi. 
Pergeseran orientasi ini merupakan menjadi salah satu kunci 
kelangsungannya. Model politik patron-klien ala rezim Orde 
Baru kembali muncul meski dengan bentuk yang berbeda; 
sifat dan bentuknya lebih cair. Jika sebelum dan pada periode 
awal reformasi orientasi gerakan ormas keagamaan radikal 
lebih didominasi motif ideologis: penegakan syariat Islam, di 
era desentralisasi demokrasi ini orientasi gerakannya berges-
er ke arah pragmatisme-ekonomis.
Keywords:  clientelism; democratic decentralization; patron-client; 
premanism; radicalism.
Introduction
Procedurally and substantially, the process of democratiza-
tion in Indonesia is continuously increasing. It can be seen from 
the implementation of direct General Election (Pemilu) and Lo-
cal Election (Pemilukada) that strengthens the state-citizen re-
lations, and the citizen awareness to the freedom of expression. 
This condition also brought changes to the character and life of 
the Indonesian society whether socially, politically, economical-
ly, or religiously. And for almost two decades, various religious 
expressions have been more dominating all those dimensions of 
life.
The domination of religion in the various dimensions of 
life in Indonesia is surely acceptable. But the pattern of religion 
and state relations in Indonesia at that time is unclear (Iqbal 
2014; Nurcholish 2011), especially during the New Order Era 
(Mudhoffir 2015), even up to now religion always appears as a 
‘shield’, ‘wrap’, even a ‘mask’ for the social, economic, and polit-
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ical benefit (Human Right Watch 2013; Rizky and Umar 2010) 
by certain individual or group (Kafid 2016). This condition con-
tinues even tends to increase after the fall of the New Order 
Regime in 1998 up to the present (Jati 2013). Ironically, in some 
cases, there are individuals or groups that frequently employ the 
ways of violence for the purpose of religious interest or ethnicity, 
and they have freedom in applying violence (Mubarak 2015). 
Freedom of expression for every citizen is fully guaranteed 
by the law in a country that applies democratic system, such 
as in Indonesia. But, unfortunately it has been utilized by in-
dividuals/groups of violence perpetrators to act in response to 
various problems in the society including the Islamic groups that 
actively carry the issue of khilāfah at the national level and the 
implementation of Islamic sharia in the local level (Buehler and 
Muhtada 2016), mass mobilization, and even economic zone 
control (Kafid 2016). These phenomena are almost similar to 
the practice of bossism in Philippines and Thailand, wherein the 
groups that apply violence have dominant role in the process of 
power contestation and economic resources control at the local 
level (Sidel 1996). 
As the democratic decentralization policy in Indonesia is 
strengthening, the phenomena of violence with religious reason 
and ethnic also have moved to the local domain, although such 
case also emerges at the national level. In Jakarta, a model of 
‘premanism’ is seen in Betawi’s Youth Communication Forum 
(Forkabi) and Betawi Rempug Forum (FBR). In Madura, after 
the construction of the Suramadu bridge, new middle classes 
emerged with patron political practices where they successfully 
monopolize economic resources by using religion as a means to 
perpetuate their political interests (Haliq 2014). In West-Kali-
mantan, the utilization of ethnic and religious identity is also 
dominant in the process of politics and security. Dayak Tradi-
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tional Council (MAD) involved in the process of mass mobiliza-
tion and political support during the election process of the re-
gional head (governor) (Jumadi and Yakoop 2014). In Buleleng, 
Bali, politics based on ethnic and religious identity also has a 
big role in various actions of political violence, economic dom-
ination, and premanism (Suputra et al. 2011). While in Solo, 
Central Java, the Islamic Youth Front of Surakarta (FPIS), a rad-
ical group that initially campaigned for the implementation of 
Islamic Sharia and liked committing raids on discotheque, then 
changed its movement into a motive of economy and politics 
(Kafid 2016).
There are many studies elaborating the analysis on the mod-
el of premanism and patron-client political model but typical-
ly limited to the cases of the secular groups and/or secular po-
litical parties. Here, the purpose of the study is to investigate 
the existence and orientation shift of the radical Islamic group 
movement in the era of democratic decentralization along with 
its influencing factors, with a case study of Islamic Reformist 
Movement (Garis) in Cianjur, West Java.
Then, in addition to the necessary to guaranty the freedom 
of expression and the proper process of decentralization in the 
nation-state context, it also needs to see how exactly the exis-
tence and orientation of radical Islamic group in the local level 
are. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a deeper and compre-
hensive study of the existence and orientation shift of the radical 
Islamic group movement in the era of democratic decentraliza-
tion along with its influencing factors. The writer believes that 
the output of this study can give contribution to the scope of the 
institution, especially in the development process of democrati-
zation at the local level of Cianjur, and throughout Indonesia in 
general. The result of the study also can be used as a material 
reference in formulating the policy, especially related to the im-
plementation of democracy.
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Similar to Solo, in Cianjur, West Java, there is a radical Is-
lamic group named the Islamic Reform Movement (Garis). The 
group was formed in 1998, initially became an element of sup-
port for the implementation of Islamic Sharia in West Java. But 
as time goes by, Garis has changed its movement into a kind 
of ‘gangster’ whose activities are similar to the local groups of 
‘premanism’, such as Pemuda Pancasila, Pemuda Siliwangi, and 
Gibas. Garis extends its influence from religious issues to the oc-
cupancy of areas. It includes “securing” the market, controlling 
parking at strategic locations, and being ‘backing’ for people 
who have problems with leasing (debt-collector) (Poskotanews 
2012; Budiyanto 2012). In addition, Garis also has a network 
with Muslim politicians and state apparatuses, and now be-
comes one of the important actors in the control of the economy 
in the local area of Cianjur. 
Historically, in the past, West Java, particularly Garut, Ta-
sikmalaya, Ciamis, and Cianjur have become the basis of strug-
gle to seize power and to establish Islamic State through Darul 
Islam Movement where Kartosuwiryo once built armed forces 
and trained the youths (Tempo 2010). In fact, based on the mon-
itoring result on religious freedom conducted by Setara Institute 
(Hasani and Naipospos 2010), It is found that some areas in 
West Java always place on the first ranks with the highest num-
ber of violence A number of pesantrens in West Java allegedly 
become the potential basis for the growth of violence movement. 
Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) is also noted to have established a pesant-
ren as one of its basis for the flourish of its political ideology in 
this region.
Various radical Islamic group movements in West Java, ac-
cording to Setara Institute (Hasani and Naipospos 2010) have 
four various forms, depending on the agenda they carry during 
the action such as the enforcement of Islamic sharia, eradication 
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of immorality and the sects considered heretical, and anti-apos-
tasy movement. In committing their actions, they build political 
support from politicians and local elites, especially when there 
are important political moments, like General Election or Local 
Election. For example, in 2001, the local political situation in 
Cianjur Regency greatly benefited Islamic organizations, such 
as Garis. At that time, Wasidi Swastomo was elected as the new 
Cianjur Regent. Wasidi initiated the implementation of Islamic 
sharia through moral improvement, known as the Community 
Development Movement of Akhlakul Karimah (Gerbang Mar-
hamah). This movement is used by some local political elites as 
a political campaign tool to get support from various Islamic 
organizations/groups, including Garis.
Various acts of terror and violence committed by Garis and 
any other similar groups, in Cianjur, if not taken into account 
could be serious threat, both for supremacy of law and legisla-
tion, as well as for the democratization process in Indonesia in 
general. Such group will always reemerge and even flourish in 
line with the strengthening of democratic decentralization pol-
icy. Why is the movement of the radical group like Garis able 
to survive, even more influential in line with the process of de-
mocratization in Indonesia? Why did Garis which was at the be-
ginning of its foundation carry the religious (Islamic) ideology, 
then transformed to a kind of ‘gangster’ and able to control the 
economic zone? Those are the urgency of this study.
In this study, the writer uses a qualitative approach to re-
veal social reality and obtain comprehensive data related to the 
existence and orientation of radical Islamic group movement in 
the era of democratic decentralization, with the case study of 
Garis in Cianjur, West Java. In-depth interview of 12 key in-
formants from local media, local politicians (from Islamic and 
secular-based political parties), business actors, academicians, 
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pesantren, religious organizations and other non-religious mass 
organizations were conducted to obtain the primary data. They 
are the parties who know enough about Garis, even have re-
lations with the activities of Garis. In addition, to sharpen the 
analysis, the writer also conducted library research from various 
sources such as books, magazines, newspapers, and other sourc-
es related to the subject matter of this research. From the data 
collected then they are analyzed through the steps of studying 
the data, reducing the data through the process of preparation 
of abstraction, and grouping the data based on the main issues. 
Then it proceeds to an interpretative step based on the existing 
theoretical framework. 
Patron-Client (Clientelism) as a Rational Action 
The collapse of the authoritarian, militaristic, and central-
istic regime of the New Order in 1998 did not directly make 
the patron-client political model existing during the regime dis-
appeared. During the New Order Era, the patronage political 
model seemed more clearly, as the patron was dominated by the 
government apparatus, military, and Golkar (party) as its politi-
cal machine. Now, the patron-client political model is more fluid 
(not single actor/group). In the era of democratic decentraliza-
tion, patrons can be played by anyone and/or any party, as long 
as they have access to control the resources. Parties that become 
clients also vary, depending on the segment and orientation.
James C. Scott (1993), presupposes the model of patronage 
relationship as the relationship between the two roles. On the 
one hand, an individual with a higher socio-economic status (as 
a patron) will utilize his or her influences and resources to pro-
vide benefits for the lower socio-economic status of the individ-
uals/groups (clients). On the other hand, the client will repay 
the benefits received from the patron, by providing support or 
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assistance, including personal services. In this context, anyone 
or group can be a patron as long as they have access to control 
resources and be able to give benefits to the client. In the era 
of democratic decentralization, as the parties can act as patron 
and client is no longer single, the model of patronage relation-
ship is also flexible, fluid, and spread. In fact, the profits that 
are exchanged depend on the kind of needs that arise and the 
resources they have.
The flexibility and fluidity of this patronage model are driv-
en by the increasingly varied choice of action (rational choice) 
as a means of both parties (patrons and client) in maintaining 
their relationship pattern. In addition, the form of reciprocity 
(reward) is also changing, depending on the socio-political set-
ting that lies behind it. It is in line with James Coleman’s ratio-
nal choice theory that emphasizes the structure of action with a 
focus on authority, belief systems, collective action, and norms. 
Authority is used to control the actions of other individuals 
who give their rights to others to control the action. Authority 
becomes an exchange when the right to control the actions of 
others is exchanged with some services (protection) or financial 
compensation in an organization (Haryanto 2011).
Changing the pattern and movement orientation of an orga-
nization can be regarded as a rational action and similar to what 
is stated by Patrick Baert (in Wirawan 2013) that this theory 
can explain social and political behavior by assuming that each 
individual acts rationally. Because the focus is on individual (ac-
tor), he is regarded as an entity that has the purpose (intention) 
of his action (Ritzer 1992). Although the purpose of an actor is 
the starting point, there are two things that can confine the ac-
tion. First is resources; actors with more ownership of resources 
will easily get their goals than those with none or little owner-
ship. Second, social institutions: negative and positive sanctions 
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that emphasize on the needs of certain actions and vice versa 
(Wirawan 2013).
Islamic Reformist Movement (Garis)
The emergence of Garis cannot be separated from the role 
of the leaders of the Islamic Propagation Council (DDI). Some 
prominent figures of this Islamic organization played an ac-
tive role and sponsored the emergence of Garis after the fall 
of Suharto in 1998. As mentioned in the official guidebook of 
Garis members, on May 14, 1998 a number of Islamic leaders 
gathered in Jakarta: like Anwar Haryono, Husein Umar, Chep 
Hermawan, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, K.H. Abdul Qodir Djaelani, 
Endang Syafe’i (Haji Dapet), K.H. Munawar, and Ahmad Su-
margono. Anwar Haryono, Husein Umar, and Ahmad Sumargo-
no are widely known as DDI figures, an organization which was 
established among others by Muhammad Natsir, former leader 
of Masyumi Party in the 1950s. In the era of democratic reform, 
DDI was directly or indirectly considered to be responsible for 
the birth of a new Islamic political party, the Crescent Star Party 
(PBB). This party, by most of its activists, is considered a contin-
uation of Masyumi Islamic party and eager to restore the glory 
of Islamic political party after the fall of the New Order.
One of the goals of Garis’ establishment is to save the 1998 
reform in favor of Muslims society as this group viewed that 
the ongoing process of political reform is controlled by the 
groups that massively promote the ideology of secularism and 
communism. According to them, these groups of secularism and 
communism continue to try to influence society, especially the 
Muslims community. Therefore, Garis was established to pro-
tect Muslim society. As a continuation of several meetings of 
DDI figures, then on July 24, 1999, Garis was officially declared 
at Pondok Gede, at the Hajj Dormitory, Jakarta, and Chep Her-
mawan was appointed as its daily leader.
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As an organization which was born from the Da’wah Coun-
cil, Garis has very strong Islamic nuances, as stated in its vision 
and mission. The vision of this organization is to fight for the 
unity of Muslims community, in the framework of the establish-
ment of Islamic sharia (daulah and khilāfah Islāmiyyah). While 
its mission, among others: first, to implement amar ma‘rūf nahī 
munkar (enjoining good, forbidding evil). Second, to help the 
poor’s burden and enourage the Muslims. Third, to maintain 
the purity of the Islamic faith (‘aqīdah) and eradicate all kinds 
of heresy and reject the rise of atheism, communism, secularism, 
pluralism, and liberalism in Indonesia in order to uphold and 
elevate the word of tauhīd. Fourth, responding to and criticiz-
ing the policies of the government considered ẓālim (unjust acts) 
and do not favor the Muslims in Indonesia. Fifth, promoting 
dakwah (propagation) and jihad for the sake of constituting ka-
limatullāh.
Although established and declared in Jakarta, Garis is rel-
atively a local-scale Islamic mass organization. Since 1999, 
Garis’s activities are is more concentrated in Cianjur Regency, 
West Java. Along with Crescent Star Party (PBB) maneuver in 
Senayan in 1999 to fight for the establishment of Islamic sharia 
through re-implementation of the Jakarta Charter, Garis also 
actively campaigned and mobilized a movement for the estab-
lishment of Islamic sharia in West Java. Until now, Garis is con-
sidered one of the prominent radical Islamic groups in Cianjur 
and its surrounding areas. Except being well-known because of 
its action that often uses violence in sweeping locations con-
sidered to be sources of disobedience, prostitution, liquor sales, 
and drugs, Garis is also known to be the most aggressive orga-
nization in rejecting the church construction and sealing the Ah-
madiyah community (Hasani and Naipospos 2010). This group 
received a bit positive response from some of the Islamic groups 
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in West Java, especially those that concern to eradicate the pro-
liferating immorality. In a relatively short time, Garis expanded 
its wings into several places. In addition to Cianjur as its center, 
Garis branches were also established in Sukabumi, Garut, and 
Tasikmalaya.
Compared to other religious organizations, the existence of 
Garis in Cianjur is relatively more advantageous based on sever-
al reasons: first, the proximity of the patron of Haji Dapet (Haji 
Endang Syafe’i), the father of Haji Chep Hermawan, Chief of 
Garis, to the activists of the Crescent Star Party (PBB) in Jakarta 
and the Da’wah Council (DDI). Haji Dapet is a successful local 
businessman in Cianjur. His business is then continued by his 
son, Chep Hermawan, up to the present. Before being a busi-
nessman, Haji Dapet had a career in the military and gave more 
sympathy to the Darul Islam (DI) movement of Kartosuwirjo in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s. Along with the failure of Darul 
Islam rebellion, as a result of his support to DI, Haji Dapet was 
finally sentenced for 15 years in Nusakambangan prison. (Inter-
view Chep Hermawan, 17/10/2012). It indicates that the role of 
Hajj Dapet in supporting the implementation of Islamic sharia 
in Cianjur was associated with the role of DI/NII activists. Al-
though in this research DI/NII linkage with the idea of Islamic 
sharia establishment in Cianjur is not clearly visible.
Second, strong financial capital owned by Haji Dapet as 
Garis patron was able to supply all of the financial needs for 
coordination and regular meetings that involve many groups. 
While other Islamic organizations in Cianjur generally do not 
have adequate financial support to make effort and mostly led 
by a leader of the pesantren.
However, Garis is not only known as an Islamic mass or-
ganization that promotes Islamic Sharia, just like the Islam-
ic Defenders Front (FPI), but also as an active political actor. 
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After Chep Hermawan failed to be nominated as a candidate 
for Vice Regent of Wasidi Soetomo in Cianjur, Garis is the only 
Islamic group that actively criticizes his policy after being elect-
ed. In fact, Wasidi Soetomo is also widely known as the Head 
of Region that strongly supports the implementation of Islamic 
Sharia in Cianjur during his reign. Although Wasidi Soetomo 
gained widespread support from the pesantren and the scholars 
in Cianjur because of his policy which is pro-Islamic sharia, it 
did not prevent Garis to blaspheme him as regarded not true 
Muslim. Garis raised the issue of the establishment of illegal 
churches in Cipanas Region (Carmel church) as an indicator of 
the local government negligence.
Garis’s political consideration whether it supports or not to 
the struggle of Gerbang Marhamah in Cianjur can also be con-
sidered as the act of Garis that choose to withdraw from the 
Islamic organizations’ network that support to the implementa-
tion of Islamic Sharia in Cianjur. As stated by Chep Hermawan 
that he was not able to believe in Wasidi Soetomo after neglect-
ing the construction of the church (Carmel) in Cipanas. In ad-
dition, Chep Hermawan also doubted the motives of the Kiai 
and other Islamic organizations in Cianjur in supporting the 
Gerbang Marhamah movement but did not take action on the 
church construction (Interview Chep Hermawan, 17/10/2012).
In fact, the various critics of Garis against Wasidi Soetomo, 
actually have much to do with the un-accommodated of their 
political aspirations, i.e. the rejection of Wasidi Soetomo and 
the ulama as Haji Dapet wanted to propose his son, Chep Her-
mawan, the Chief of Garis, as the Vice Regent candidate during 
the Regional Election at that time. This rejection has made Haji 
Dapet who has much contributed to the funding for the mobi-
lization movement in supporting the implementation of Islamic 
Sharia in 1999-2000 was heavily offended and this situation has 
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made the relationship of Garis with Kiai in Cianjur got worse. 
Except actively doing a campaign for the implementation 
of Islamic Sharia in Cianjur and its surrounding areas, Garis 
also often takes part in joint actions with various elements of Is-
lamic organizations in Jakarta. For instance, the demonstration 
to refuse the candidacy of Ahok (Basuki Tjahaja Purnama) as 
Jakarta’s Governor after Jokowi (Joko Widodo) was elected as 
the President in 2014. In addition, Garis also has several times 
joined the demonstration movement in support of Palestine, 
criticizing Israel and USA in Jakarta. 
There are no exact data about how many members of Garis 
in Cianjur and other areas. In several religious events held in 
Garis’ leader house, they were generally attended by hundreds 
of its members and sympathizers from Cianjur and surround-
ing areas. During the demonstrations in Cianjur with regard 
to the rejection of the Carmel church, alcohol raids, and an-
ti-Ahmadiyah movement, it is usually followed by around 100 
people. Chep Hermawan usually leads the action by driving his 
luxurious car, followed by the dozens of motorcycles behind it. 
(Interview AH, 27/12/2014).
In the mid of 2014, Garis and some of its leaders became 
widespread concern of Indonesia society. It is related to their 
support to the radical movement of Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS), which has established a Caliphate with Abu Bakar 
al-Baghdadi as its caliph. Garis also sent some of its members 
to a declaration to support ISIS in Jakarta. Chep Hermawan 
himself is also not free from controversy when declaring himself 
as a President of ISIS Indonesia. Because of those actions, while 
ISIS by the Indonesian government was also regarded as an in-
ternational terrorist organization, Chep Hermawan and some 
of Garis leaders were arrested by the police after visiting Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir at Nusakambangan prison in Cilacap. According 
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to the police, Chep Hermawan’s groups were bringing ISIS’s flag 
and waving it as they came to Cilacap. Garis involvement in the 
development of ISIS in Indonesia has further strengthened its 
reputation in the eyes of outsiders as an radical Islamic group 
movement (DetikNews 2014). 
Political Clientelism as Garis’ Survival Strategy 
As an Islamic organization which is known to be very vocal 
and actively performs various actions to fight for the implemen-
tation of Islamic Sharia in Cianjur, Garis does not stand alone. 
Garis has strong patterns of movement and political network 
with various parties that have access to resources whether in 
politics, social, economy, and religion.
In the beginning, Garis has a close political relationship with 
the politicians of the Crescent Star Party (PBB). While religious-
ly it is close to the Da’wah Council and economically gets fi-
nancial support from family business heritage. But recently it 
has changed a lot. Garis relationship with the political parties 
is not only with the Islamic political parties such as PBB, but 
also with the secular political parties such as Golkar and Gerin-
dra. Hereby, Garis is not only known as an Islamic organization 
that promotes Islamic Sharia but also as an active political actor. 
Some of the members of Garis also become board members of 
certain political parties. Even Chep Hermawan himself was ever 
registered as PBB official of Cianjur District and also has close 
relation to Gerindra. During 2014 General Election, political-
ly Garis did not only support single party, but also supported 
other parties like PAN, Golkar, and Gerindra. (Interview MT, 
26/12/2014). Even, Garis then has a close relationship with the 
Democratic Party and it is caused by a familial relationship be-
tween the head of Garis and the officials of Democrat Party of 
Cianjur (Interview AH, 27/12/2014).
The liquid affiliation of Garis in politics, which is no longer 
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associated to Islamic-based political parties, is also recognized 
by academician from Suryakencana University, Cianjur, as well 
as observers of the social, political, and religious issues in Cian-
jur: 
“I think that Garis political affiliation is liquid. Although Garis 
has Islamic ideology, many of the Garis functionaries have po-
litical positions in non-Islamic based parties such as in Golkar, 
PDI-P, PPP, PBB, and Democrats. I do not think Garis has prob-
lem in political communication.”(Interview DM, 17/12/2014). 
Garis’s active engagement in politics is supported by the 
strength of its social capital. Garis’ leader has good communi-
cation with political parties and also close to other mass organi-
zations in Cianjur, both Islamic such as FPI and secular such as 
Pemuda Pancasila (PP). Apart from that, Garis gives special at-
tention to the youth especially the student’s organization called 
Rumbis. Although it is indirectly part of Garis, most of its activ-
ity is often supported by Garis, especially regarding building use 
and some other financial needs. (Interview DM, 17/12/2014). 
The proximity of Garis with Pemuda Pancasila is not merely 
a relationship based on interest, but more on familial relation-
ship. The younger sister of Garis leader got married to the son of 
the head of PP Cianjur. (Interview MT, 26/12/2014). This close 
relationship also made the conflict that ever happened between 
PP Cianjur and Garis easier to be solved. Some conflicts hap-
pened between them among others are Ariel Peterpan case in 
Bandung in which PP supported Ariel Peterpan while Garis was 
in opposite position, the conflict in Cipanas, as well as several 
other cases unrelated to religious issues in Cianjur (Interview SS, 
26/12/2014).
Meanwhile, Garis relationship with other radical Islamic 
organizations such as FPI, Gibas, and so forth, are due to the 
historical fact and financial support. Most of them (FPI and the 
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other similar organizations) were originally part of or have been 
members of Garis in promoting the issue of Islamic Sharia im-
plementation in Cianjur. But lately, without definite reason, their 
relationship is no longer harmonious. Some of them got separat-
ed and then established new organizations, including FPI, Gem-
par, and the similar. (Interview ASH, 25/12/2014). Nevertheless, 
all organizations that previously have been part of Garis yet they 
have become independent organizations, still continue to estab-
lish communication and coordination with Garis, especially in 
term of conducting sweeping and raid actions (Interview of UA, 
16/11/2014).
At a glance, it is apparent that Garis relationship with other 
radical Islamic organizations in Cianjur has a problem. Their 
strength that used to be one has already split into various forms. 
But it does not prevent their coordination and communication 
relationship, especially in undertaking a costly action. This is al-
legedly due to the strong financial capital owned by Garis. Com-
pared to the other mass organizations established after the Ref-
ormation Era in 1998, Garis is economically well-established. 
The Head of Garis has various businesses that can be used as 
financial support in every movement; starting from the owner-
ship of plastic processing business, market, stalls, sand-digs, up 
to residential property business. That is why Garis financially 
has no problem and does not rely on the government for finan-
cial support. Even, some of the Islamic organizations that have 
similar idea to promote Islamic Sharia implementation in Cian-
jur mostly request for financial assistance to Garis (Interview of 
UA, 16/11/2014).
The ‘split’ that occurred between Garis with other mass orga-
nizations in Cianjur, according to ASH (interview, 25/12/2014) 
was caused by its political interests. According to him, the act 
of Garis that criticized Gerbang Marhamah regulation is only a 
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reaction to its disappointment on the rejection of the nomina-
tion of Chep Hermawan as a candidate of vice regent of Wasidi 
Soetomo in the local election (Pilkada) of Cianjur. Similarly, the 
act of Garis in declaring its willingness to provide a place of 
burial for the Bali Bombers and the declaration of Chep Her-
mawan as the president of ISIS Indonesia, are also considered its 
strategy in utilizing the momentum to be well acknowledged by 
the public.
Even in the case of assaulting and sealing the mosque of 
Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) in Cianjur, according to one 
of Ahmadiyah figures in Cianjur, AH (interview, 27/12/2014) is 
merely an attempt to show its existence and to increase the pres-
tige of Garis to be better known nationally. Therefore, the JAI 
considers that the actions taken by Garis are not for religious 
reasons. Those who become the members of Garis do not have 
adequate religious understanding. Considering that, Garis never 
attended scientific discussion held by JAI Cianjur which aims to 
discuss their disagreement with JAI existence in Cianjur. Once, 
there was a representative who claimed to be a representative of 
Garis. But after being confirmed to the related person, he was a 
representative of Jamaah Tabligh Cianjur.
‘Utilizing’ religious issues as the alibi in various activities of 
Garis movement were proven lately. Garis is allegedly involved 
in many ‘backing’ for parties that have problems with the leas-
ing of motor vehicles. People in Cianjur who have problems with 
motor vehicle loan payments and being chased by debt-collec-
tors were looking for protection to Garis. Therefore, there has 
been a physical clash between Garis and the debt collectors who 
want to take back the motor vehicles which credits are consid-
ered problematic (Budiyanto 2012; Poskotanews 2012). So, it 
is not surprising that in front of the headquarter as well as the 
head of Garis’ house in Cianjur, there is a big banner expressing 
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invitation to the people of Cianjur regency to fight for the debt 
collectors. Since then, their existence is considered trouble mak-
er. It is also acknowledged by MT, the politician of PBB Cianjur 
(Interview, MT 26/12/2014).
The use of religious issues as the alibi or shield of Garis’ 
movements is also recognized by a politician of Gerindra, as 
well as caretaker of PP Cianjur. According to him, any move-
ment of Islamic-based mass organizations in Cianjur, including 
Garis, often use religion as a mask to gain their profit. (Interview 
SS: 26/12/2014). For them, the most important thing is respect-
ing each other, keeping safe, and not interfering their respective 
zone. So there is no clash as every mass organization in Cianjur 
already has its own territory and work area respectively:
“... each has its own territory. Garis has its own territory. Di-
shub (government’s department of transportation) has a car 
parking. Pemuda Pancasila takes control of discotheque. So, 
each is not supposed to disturb other domain. What makes a 
problem is because of the disturbing of others. So actually we 
know which Garis’ domain, PP’s domain, and GIBAS’ domain. 
Each is not allowed to get into other domain because it would 
disturb others. Before I took control of this discotheque, it 
was often raided. But now it was not, as everyone has already 
known it” (Interview SS: 26/12/2014).
In addition, Garis also has established a pesantren as a shield 
and supporters for its movement. One of the leaders of a pe-
santren in Cianjur in the beginning sympathized with the Garis 
movement that actively promotes the implementation of Islamic 
Sharia in Cianjur. But later after having known that Garis has 
conducted a lot of provocative activities by bringing the name 
of pesantren, then many pesantrens withdrew their support. 
Pesantrens feel much ‘abused’ by Garis movement that always 
brings religion as its excuse. For example, during the demon-
stration and sweeping action, Garis often invites Santri with 
P O L I T I CA L  C L I E N T E L I S M  A S  T H E  WAY  O F  S U RV I VA L  . . .
Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan 85
the ground to attend religious activities. The students usually 
will be picked up and guarded by car for free. (Interview SU: 
27/12/2014). Since then, Garis relationship with the pesantren 
began to crack.
Despite the relation of Garis with some other mass organi-
zations (both religious and secular), Kiai, pesantren, and some 
politicians in Cianjur begun to crack, but its existence remains 
sturdy, even its movement is predicted to continue and grow. 
Garis is a religious organization that has many strong economic 
resources compared to other organizations in Cianjur. Except 
promoting the issue of Islamic Sharia implementation as its capi-
tal to attract religious sympathy in the region of Cianjur, Garis 
also has become a magnet of economy so that it easily recruit 
its members. (Interview DM: 17/12/2014). Since the leader of 
Garis has the largest plastic processing company in Cianjur, 
Garis is able to attract a lot of manpower. From this factory also, 
he opened a business relationship with Jakarta, as a supplier of 
finished and semi-finished materials from the processed plastic. 
In fact, in several demonstration activities, Garis also involved 
its employees as demonstrators. (Interview DM: 17/12/2014).
Changing the Movement Orientation 
In the early period of its emergence, the orientation of Garis 
movement was dominated by ideological motives, with the main 
issue of Islamization or Islamic Sharia implementation. But in 
the next stage of its development, its orientation has shifted from 
ideological motives to economy. Yet, its ideological motive is not 
completely vanished but already mixed with economic motives. 
In other word, pragmatism—of economy—has now become its 
new ideology that underlies the change of its orientation and 
motive movement. Religious motive is used as justifications for 
its economic and political interests.
The politics of clientelism practiced by Garis that involved 
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a number of other radical Islamic groups or organizations both 
Islamic and secular as well as politicians or political parties in 
the local area of Cianjur eventually led to premanism action. 
Thus, it can be said that democratization at the local level grows 
and develops in line with the strengthening of groups or organi-
zations of premanism. Religious characteristic and identity were 
successfully played by Garis, for the purpose of its existence and 
movement in Cianjur.
The change of orientation, motive, and affiliation of Garis 
movement, in this case, from supporting Islamic Sharia imple-
mentation to the mastery of political and economic resources, 
such as assigning its members as representatives of the regional 
people, attempting to control local but failed, controlling the 
parking lot, market security, and other ‘illegal’ businesses are 
rational choices in order to survive. 
The flexibility and fluidity of this patronage model, which 
then influence to its orientation and movement are driven by 
the increasingly varied choices of action (rational choice) as the 
means of both sides (patrons and client) in maintaining their re-
lationship pattern. In addition, the kind of reward is also chang-
ing, depending on the socio-political setting that lies behind it. It 
is in line with James Coleman’s rational choice theory, that the 
authority is used to control the actions of other individuals who 
give their rights to others to control the action (Haryanto 2011). 
Since the authority becomes an exchange, when the right to con-
trol the actions of others is exchanged with some services (pro-
tection) or financial compensation in an organization in order to 
be able to exist and survive, Garis took an action to shift its affil-
iation movement. Islamic political parties, Islamic politicians, as 
well as Islamic organizations are no longer its dominance affili-
ation. Even in some cases, the affiliation built by Garis does not 
always make its goals successfully achieved. 
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Based on analysis, the change of motives and orientation of 
Garis did not suddenly occur. There are some factors, among 
others.
First, fighting for economic resources. The will to control 
economic resources becomes dominant factor affecting to the 
existence and orientation change of Garis movement in Cianjur 
and its surrounding areas from Islamism to premanism. Former-
ly, Garis actively promoted the issue of Islamic Sharia imple-
mentation, later it much involved in backing for those who have 
problems with leasing (debt-collector). Even the issue which is 
arising up still using religious identity and for the purposes of 
defending the interests of society, it turns behind the guise that 
there is a financial benefit gained by Garis. For example, the 
effort to take back motor vehicles which credits are considered 
problematic, there is a considerable cost of withdrawal. Approx-
imately, the fee is about 10 Million Rupiah for two-wheeled mo-
tor vehicles and more than 10 Million Rupiah for four-wheeled 
motor vehicles. This withdrawal fee is allegedly the motive of 
Garis in protecting the troubled party earlier. If the leasing party 
is willing to recover the vehicle with the credit problem, then it 
should pay the fee. (Interview AH, 27/12/2014).
In addition, Garis also becomes a safeguard for some ‘illegal 
sand digging’ in Cikalong, Cianjur (Interview AH, 27/12/2014). 
There are some sand digging areas that belong to Garis’ leader 
family. So it is not surprising if the orientation of Garis move-
ment has changed. They just use religion as a ‘shield’ for their 
economy-oriented action. In fact, Garis also has an economical-
ly viable ‘land clearing’ area, as ‘land plots’ are also owned by 
other mass organization. (Interview SS: 26/12/2014).
This situation forced Garis to change its movement orien-
tation to maintain its power and followers. If resource is not 
occupied by Garis, while other similar organization takes it, they 
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might lose their authority to control the new potential economic 
resources in Cianjur Regency. In fact, some of the similar orga-
nizations in Cianjur, like FPI and Gibas that are formerly part 
of Garis’ members then got separated and tried to occupy it. 
Although both of them also have their own ‘area’. 
Second, weak bureaucracy and law enforcement. Another 
factor that contributes to the orientation change of Garis move-
ment in Cianjur and its surrounding areas is weak bureaucracy 
and law enforcement from the government apparatus. The high 
threat felt by the political elites or society, in general, made Garis 
and other similar mass organizations in Cianjur have an alterna-
tive choice (rational choice) to become a kind of ‘protector’ for 
certain interests. This condition allows them to negotiate for the 
benefit of a particular person or group.
In Cianjur Regency, there are many bureaucratic affairs 
that are considered too complicated. Some parties then request 
that any process is supposed to be faster. In the case of busi-
ness license for example, because the businessmen do not want 
to get disturbed then they mostly choose to give bribe for the 
purpose of quick service. As a result, many emerging businesses 
are illegal, or contrary to the vision of Cianjur Regency itself 
such as sand mining, and night entertainment. (Interview AH, 
27/12/2014). Even though mass organization such as Garis of-
ten conducts sweeping and raiding, their businesses still keep 
running as they thought to have paid some money for guarantee, 
not the official state’s tax. Besides, they also have got backing for 
their businesses.
In fact, the government and the security apparatus actually 
know the existence and actions of all organizations in Cianjur 
Regency. But, as their existence is politically considered profit-
able, especially in terms of mass mobilization to give support 
during General and Local Elections, then they got a chance to 
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exist and develop. Therefore, both mass organizations and gov-
ernment officials in Cianjur Regency have already known their 
own domain (Interview SS, 26/12/2014).
These conditions then influence the existence, sustainabili-
ty, and movement orientation of the radical Islamic group, like 
Garis, in Cianjur Regency. Apart from that the weak of the state 
apparatus will also open contestation opportunities for the peo-
ple to fight for the access of resources. Moreover, if the resource 
would give profits economically, the contestation among mass 
organizations, between mass organization and the community, 
and between mass organization and government possibly hap-
pens. The party that wins the contestation will certainly use all 
of the resources, including using religious issues, as practiced by 
Garis.
Conclusion
In general, it can be said that the existence, development, 
and orientation of radical Islamic group movement in the era 
of democratic decentralization in Cianjur, West Java are quite 
unique. James C. Scott (1993) states that patronage model is 
preserved and sustains their existence although its nature and 
form are more fluid. Patrons provide life guarantees (security or 
economy) by providing access to resources, while clients act as 
the guardians of politics, economy, and mass mobilization sup-
port. Such patronage relationship is a rational choice for both 
parties to be able to survive and develop along with the dynam-
ics of social and political development. 
The patronage relationship did not occur formally organi-
zational but rather informal. In addition, if the political affili-
ation of radical religious organizations before and in the early 
period of Reformation Era was more dominated by Islamic po-
litical parties, especially political parties that actively promoted 
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the implementation of Islamic sharia, in this era of democratic 
decentralization their political affiliation is liquid. This condi-
tion happened because of the political reality that the politicians 
mostly prefer to save their own businesses, votes, or constituents 
rather than party’s ideology. The society also needs backing in 
case of having problems while the state’s apparatus seemed to be 
slow in giving responses. 
If before and during the early period of reform, the orienta-
tion of the radical religious group movements was more domi-
nated by ideological motive that is the implementation of Islam-
ic sharia, then in the era of democratic decentralization their ori-
entation has shifted to economic pragmatism. Their ideological 
motive does not completely disappear but already mixed or just 
used as a wrap or mask for economic motives. In other words, 
pragmatism has become new ideology that underlies the change 
of their orientation and movement motives.
The development of political clientelism model involving a 
number of radical religious organizations with local politicians 
to some extent endangers the behavior of premanism and cor-
ruption at the local level. In fact, democratization at the local 
level grows and develops with the growth of premanism orga-
nizations, similar to the practices of bossism in Philippine and 
Thailand (Sidel 1996). This condition also happened in Cianjur, 
West Java due to the interest of controlling economic resources 
so that all the parties consider necessary to maintain the areas 
that become the sources of their economy. So what happens is 
every party controls the area that is claimed to be their territory. 
The weak bureaucracy and law enforcement are the indication 
that the state’s apparatuses are absent in solving various bureau-
cratic and security problem. And public order issues become a 
kind of justification for the emergence and development of radi-
cal religious organizations in the local level. The state seems too 
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busy with the issue of the day to day politics. The issue of life 
demands and community services has become less of a concern. 
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